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The Addis Ababa Integrated Housing Development 
Program aims to tackle the housing shortage and 
unemployment that prevail in Addis Ababa by deploying 
and supporting small and medium scale enterprises to 
construct low-cost housing using technologies novel for 
Ethiopia. The motivation for such support is predicated 
on the view that small firms create more jobs per unit 
of investment by virtue of being more labor intensive 
and that the jobs so created are concentrated among the 
low-skilled and hence the poor. To assess whether the 
program has succeeded in biasing technology adoption 
in favor of labor and thereby contributed to poverty 
reduction, the impact of the program on technology 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, Africa Region—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to support evidence based policy making. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cruggeriladerchi@worldbank.org.  
usage, labor intensity, and earnings is investigated using 
a unique matched workers-firms dataset, the Addis 
Ababa Construction Enterprise Survey. The data are 
representative of all registered construction firms in 
Addis and were collected specifically for the purpose of 
analyzing the impact of the program. The authors find 
that program firms do not adopt different technologies 
and are not more labor intensive than non-program 
firms. There is an earnings premium for program 
participants, who tend to be relatively well-educated, 
which is heterogeneous and highest for those at the 
bottom of the earnings distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Whether or not programs which promote small and medium scale (SME) enterprises can stimulate job 
creation and contribute to poverty reduction in developing countries is an important question. The 
motivation for such support is often predicated on the view that small firms create more jobs per unit 
of investment by virtue of being more labor intensive and that the jobs so created are concentrated 
among the low-skilled and hence the poor. In spite of the policy prominence of SME support 
programs, the empirical evidence for these propositions is weak. In a recent review of the literature 
Betcherman et al. (2004, p51) conclude: 
 
The evaluation literature on the labor market impacts of ALMPs [Active Labor Market Programs] is 
thinnest in the case of micro-enterprise development and self-employment assistance programs. There 
are relatively few studies and of those that do exist, many are concerned with the program's effect on 
business development rather than on the future employment and earnings of participants. 
 
The sparse available empirical evidence is entirely based on the experiences of developed and 
transition economies and suggests that micro-enterprise development programs typically have a 
positive impact on the employment prospects of participants, while their impact on earnings is mixed 
(see e.g. Fretwell et al, 1999, Tzannatos & Dar, 1999, and Betcherman et al. 2004). 
This paper provides an analysis of the Addis Ababa Integrated Housing Program (AAIHDP) 
which is an active labor market program that attempts to tackle the severe housing shortages and high 
unemployment that prevail in Addis Ababa by deploying and supporting labor-intensive SMEs to 
construct low-cost condominium housing using technologies novel for Ethiopia. To assess whether 
the program has succeeded in biasing technology adoption in favor of labor and thereby contributed to 
poverty reduction, the impact of the program on technology usage, labor intensity and earnings of 
participants is investigated using a unique matched workers-firms dataset, the Addis Ababa 
Construction Enterprise Survey (AACES), which is representative of all registered construction firms 
in Addis, and was designed specifically for the purpose of analyzing the impact of the program.
1  
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the program and its rationale. 
The data collected to analyze it is presented in section 3, which also presents descriptive statistics on 
the characteristics of program and non-program firms. In section 4 we assess the impact of the 
program on technology adoption. Section 5 describes the differences between program participants 
and non-participants and assesses the program’s impact on earnings A final section concludes.  
 
2.  The Addis Ababa Integrated Housing Program (AAIHDP) 
 
By creating and supporting SMEs the AAIHDP aims to tackle simultaneously the problems of a 
housing shortage and unemployment. The specific objectives of the program include `promotion of 
micro and small-scale enterprises, which can absorb more labor force and operate at a lower 
overhead cost' as well as `promotion of cost efficient housing construction technology' (HDPO, 2004, 
p1). To achieve these objectives, the AAIHDP aims to construct 192,500 houses, generate 80,000 job 
opportunities, support 1,300 existing SMEs and create another 1,000 new ones.  
To construct housing affordable by low-income dwellers, the IHDP designed a production 
process that deviates from the one conventionally used in the construction sector. The low-cost aspect 
of the program consists in building a less luxurious, homogeneous type of housing using novel low-
cost construction technologies such as pre-cast beams and ribslabs, fixed-price contracts and 
standardized production procedures permitting greater specialization. To implement this production 
process, the IHDP intervenes in the construction sector by both creating new SMEs and providing 
support for firms in the program.  
Participation in the program is conditional on passing a test. Anybody who has either 
                                                 
1 This paper focuses on these aspects of SMEs and does not consider other possible benefits, such as their 
contributions to competition, entrepreneurship and innovation, creation of products which are more suitable for 
the poor as well as social and political dividends. See e.g. Biggs (2002) and Halberg (2001) for reviews of the 
empirical evidence regarding such benefits.   -3-
graduated from a Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) college or can show 
proof of having experience in the construction sector can take a test to participate in the program. 
Successful candidates can establish an enterprise, either by themselves or together with other 
successful applicants. Individuals who failed the test are allowed to resit the test at a later date and 
may attempt to upgrade their skills by joining successful candidates in the project as apprentices. 
Once firms are formed, they can register their interest in IHDP construction work with the 
Program Office, which is in charge of implementing the program. Existing firms are not allowed to 
compete for IHDP jobs unless IHDP capacity does not suffice. In theory, incumbent firms could 
attempt to join the program by having their employees take the test and regroup as a "new" firm. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not very common. The IHDP does not create firms which can 
execute foundational and structural works but it does hire existing firms for these tasks. For the 
purposes of this paper, firms which can execute such tasks are referred to as contractors, while firms 
which cannot are referred to as constructors. The latter category consists predominantly of SMEs and 
is consequently of focal interest.
2   
The IHDP provides wide-ranging support to firms participating in the program by i) providing 
and, in certain cases, subsidizing a place to work, ii) facilitating access to credit, iii) providing training 
and access to inputs (on credit), iv) subsidizing machinery for firms producing rebars (reinforcement 
bars) or hollow blocks, v) providing training to firms engaging in pre-cast beam and hollow block 
production and vi) awarding contracts to program firms. Not all newly created SMEs are awarded 
contracts but IHDP contracts are almost exclusively awarded to firms created by the IHDP (except for 
contracts assigned to contractors). 
By providing these different types of support the program alters the factor prices different 
firms face, which in turn affect technology adoption and factor choices and thus labor demand. The 
program does not affect technology adoption or factor usage directly. The modeling challenge is to 
identify the impact of the IHDP interventions on labor demand and earnings and separate the effect of 
the program from differences between participants and non-participants not due to participation.  
At this juncture, it is important to note that the unit of analysis in this paper is the firm, not the 
house being constructed. Our data enable us to assess the impact of the program on the technology 
and labor intensity of constructors and contractors separately. The labor demand of the housing 
construction sector as a whole may also be affected by the mix between constructors and contractors 
in the construction process, if these firms differ in their labor intensity and/or adopt different 
technologies. Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to rigorously assess whether, and if so to what 
extent, such substitution effects are occurring.    
 
3.  The Addis Ababa Construction Enterprise Survey (AACES)  
 
The AACES is a survey of matched firms and workers in the construction sector in Addis Ababa, 
designed specifically for the purpose of analyzing the employment creation impact of the IHDP 
World Bank (2007). It was conducted by the Ethiopian Economic Association in collaboration with 
the World Bank in December 2006 and early January 2007. It covered 240 firms and 971 workers, 
241 of whom were casual workers. The workers' data contains detailed information on workers' 
earnings, their employment history, experience, skills, educational background, program participation, 
job satisfaction, motivation for choosing their current activity and on a number of socio-demographic 
characteristics including household characteristics and parental background. 
The worker data will be considered in section 5, here we focus on the firm data. The sample 
of firms contains data on 103 non-program constructors, 92 program constructors, 17 non-program 
contractors and 28 program contractors. A program firm is defined as a firm which fulfils at least one 
of three criteria; i) having been created by the program ii) having received support from the program 
or iii) having worked for the program.
3 The firm-level data provide information on a rich set of firm 
                                                 
2 Conventionally, all firms with a contracting license grade - an indicator of technological capability - are 
referred to as contractors. Firms with a contracting license grade between 1 and 6 can execute foundational and 
structural works, while those with a license grade between 7 and 10 cannot. For expositional purposes we only 
refer to a subset of this group, namely those with a license grade between 1 and 6 as "contractors" in this paper. 
3 In addition, there was one firm engaging in pre-cast beam production which did not meet any of these criteria   -4-
characteristics, including their activities, age, size, capital stock, inputs, outputs, expenditures, 
revenues, organizational and occupational structure, program participation and receipt of program 
support, access to finance and inputs, skilled personnel, constraints, expectations, their labor force and 
wages. In addition, the data contain information on the volume and total costs of inputs and outputs, 
enabling us to compute firm-specific input and output-prices, which provide natural instruments for 
factor choices. 
Table 1 present descriptive statistics on program firms and non-program firms. On average, 
program firms employ more workers, have more capital, use more inputs and have a better educated 
workforce. In Graph 1, the amount of capital per worker is plotted against the size of the firm 
measured in terms of the number of employees.  Capital intensity does not seem to differ between 
program and non-program firms and also does not vary systematically with firm-size, though 
contractors are significantly more capital intensive than constructors. These findings are backed up by 
regressions of capital intensity on firm-size (column 1), firm-size and program-participation (column 
2), and firm-size, program-participation, and being a contractor (column 3) presented in Table 2. 
Neither the program dummy, nor the interactions of the program dummy with firm-size or being a 
contractor
4 are significant, confirming that program firms are not more or less capital intensive than 
non-program firms. Moreover, the results do not suggest a relationship between firm-size and capital 
intensity. Contractors are significantly more capital-intensive than constructors, but the capital-
intensity of contractors also does not vary with firm size. 
Input-intensity does not seem to depend on program participation or on firm-size either, as 
illustrated by Graph 2, which plots input usage per worker against the number of workers. The graph 
does show that contractors seem to use more inputs per worker. Regressions presented in Table 3 
reveal that input intensity is strongly correlated with capital-intensity and confirm that contractors use 
more input per worker, even after controlling for firm-size and capital intensity (see column 4). Size 
variables and program participation indeed have no impact, corroborating the intuition from the 
graphs. 
 
4.  Assessing Program Impact on Technology Adoption 
 
4.1  A Cobb-Douglas Technology 
 
To assess the impact of the IHDP on technology adoption and productivity a human capital 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated; output, Y, is modeled as a 
function of physical capital, K , human capital, H,  material inputs, M, and a technology 
parameter, A, using the familiar formula: 
γ β α M H AK Y = .
5 Human capital, H, is assumed to 
be a function of the educational attainment of the workforce, E, and the number of workers L:  
) (E h Le H = . This formulation enables us to control for both the quantity of labor, proxied by 
the number of workers, L, and the "quality" of labor, proxied by some function h(E) of the 
average educational attainment of workers. Controlling for the skill level of workers is 
important since it will be shown that workers in program firms are on average better 
educated. Taking logs and imposing a linear functional form, i.e.  E E h
β
δ
= ) ( , yields an 
estimable equation of the human capital augmented production function: 
                                                                                                                                                        
but was classified as a program firm since the pre-cast beam technology is not widely applied by non-program 
firms as yet. 
4 As a robustness check, controls for different activities were included, to analyse whether the composition of 
the sample could be driving the results. Controlling for activities did not overturn the result, nor did controlling 
for the interaction between activities and the size of the firms. Results omitted to conserve space, but available 
upon request 
5 Our starting point for assessing technology differences was the more general translog production function. 
Since the translog specifications comfortably accepted Cobb-Douglas restrictions, we proceeded with Cobb-
Douglas production functions. Results are omitted to conserve space, but available upon request.   -5-
 
u M E L K A Y + + + + + = ln ln ln ln ln ln γ δ β α  
 
The "quality" of the labor force matters if δ≠0. In our baseline specifications, however,  δ  is 
assumed to be zero (an assumption that is relaxed later). 
To test whether program firms use a technology that differs from non-program firms, 
all the parameters of the production function are interacted with program participation, P. 
 
M E L K A Y ln ln ln ln ln ln γ δ β α + + + + =  
e M P M L P L K P K A P A + + + + + ln * ln * ln * ln * ρ ρ ρ ρ  
 
Under the null hypothesis of no differences in technology adoption, all interaction 
terms should be zero, both individually and jointly. The null hypothesis is rejected if at least 
one of them or any combination of them is significantly different from zero. This testing 
procedure is very general since we allow the program to impact on all parameters of the 
production function. 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS estimation of the production function. The 
dependent variable is the log of annual revenue.
6 The baseline explanatory variables are the 
factors of production and activity dummies. Information on one or more explanatory 
variables are missing for 70 firms, forcing us to reduce our sample to 170 observations. The 
specification presented in column 1 tests whether the technology used by contractors is 
different from that used by constructors. This is indeed the case; the dummy on being a 
contractor and the interaction term on being a contractor and capital are both strongly 
significant. Since the group of constructors is of focal interest and because the sample of 
contractors for whom production functions can be estimated is very small, we focus on 
constructors for the rest of this subsection. 
The specification in column 2 tests for differences in technology between program 
constructors and non-program constructors. The null hypothesis that no such differences exist 
cannot be rejected since neither the program dummy nor the interaction terms of program 
participation with labor, capital and inputs are individually or jointly significant. 
The specification in column 3 attempts to assess the impact of the heterogeneity of 
labor by including measures of the educational attainment and age of the workforce as 
additional explanatory variables. Neither enters significantly; the higher educational 
achievement of workers in program firms does not translate into higher productivity. 
Overall, the basic Cobb-Douglas specifications fit the data rather well, as judged by 
the adjusted R
2 consistently exceeding 0.6. In addition, parameter estimates are consistent 
with Constant Returns to Scale for both program and non-program firms. 
 
 
4.2 Tackling Endogeneity 
 
It is well-known that OLS-estimates of the production function may be misleading when one or more 
of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, for example because of measurement 
error, simultaneous determination of inputs and outputs or omitted variable bias (see e.g. Ackerberg, 
                                                 
6 Given the existence of a fixed price system, prices for products of program firms and non-program firms might 
differ, causing revenue to be a misleading indicator of productivity. We investigated this possibility by 
regressing price deflators on activity dummies and program participation but could not find evidence for 
systematic price differences between program and non-program firms. In addition, deflating revenue and inputs 
by output and input price deflators did not affect the overall pattern of results. Results omitted to conserve 
space, but available upon request.   -6-
2005). In addition to these conventional endogeneity concerns, we have to be on guard for selection 
bias, which arises when program participation is correlated with the error term, for example because 
there are unobserved factors not controlled for in the production function which are correlated with 
both productivity and the decision to participate.  
Instrumental variables methods are used to deal with these endogeneity problems.
7 To 
alleviate instrumenting requirements Constant Returns to Scale restrictions are imposed, enabling us 
to estimate output per worker as a function of the capital labor ratio and inputs per worker. To further 
facilitate identification, capital is assumed to be exogenous. The motivation for the latter assumption 
is that the capital stock is unlikely to change very much in the short run given high adjustment costs, 
while input usage is typically much more volatile. Given the severity of identification requirements, 
our strategy is to first assess the impact of the two types of endogeneity in isolation, before attempting 
to tackle their joint effect. An inputs price index is used as an instrument for inputs usage. Price is a 
theoretically appealing instrument since it is likely to affect output only through its impact on factor 
usage. Ackerberg et al. (forthcoming) warn us, however, that orthogonality may nevertheless be 
violated when price differences are correlated with unobserved quality differences in both inputs and 
outputs. Program participation is instrumented using the size of the firm at startup, which we have 
shown to be strongly correlated with program participation. At startup, the firm has not yet benefited 
from IHDP support; size at startup is consequently exogenous under the fairly mild restriction that 
there is no direct link between initial size and productivity once current size is accounted for.  
The results of our instrumenting regressions are presented in Table 5 and the corresponding 
first stage regressions are presented in Table A1 in the appendix. In column 1 endogeneity of inputs is 
the sole concern; program firms and non-program firms are pooled together and input usage is 
instrumented using the input price deflator, which is a good instrument as judged by the Cragg-
Donald F statistic of 13.24. The resulting parameter estimate of the contribution of inputs to revenue 
is somewhat higher than the corresponding OLS estimate (presented in Table A2), yet the Hausman 
test comfortably accepts the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. This suggest that exogeneity of inputs 
is not a bad assumption, which is consistent with (statistically) random rationing of inputs in the 
presence of input constraints. 
In columns 2 and 3 inputs- and capital per worker are assumed exogenous and selection bias 
is the key concern. To facilitate identification, column 2 models the impact of the program as a 
technology shifter. The results do not indicate that the program succeeds in increasing productivity; if 
anything, program firms are less productive. Moreover, IV estimates are lower than OLS estimates, 
suggesting upward, rather than downward selection bias. A possible explanation for such upward bias 
is that the program is capable of selecting the most able workers (amongst applicants). The 
specification in column 3 is more general as it also allows for an impact of the program on capital and 
inputs usage. The null hypothesis of no difference in technology cannot be rejected, though the 
parameter estimates are imprecise. Hausman tests comfortably accept the null of no exogeneity for 
both specifications, suggesting that the impact of selection bias is not large. 
Columns 4 and 5 allow for the coexistence of selection bias and endogeneity of inputs usage. 
In column 4, the program impact is again modeled using a dummy, which is negative and 
insignificant. Column 5 adopts a more general specification. Parameter estimates are poorly behaved, 
probably because the predicted program participation and instrumented interactions are highly 
correlated. In addition, instruments are weak, as evidenced by the Cragg-Donald F score of 0.749. In 
short, the results of this estimation are disappointing. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that the 
program has no impact on technology adoption is not rejected in either specification and Hausman 
tests do not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
In conclusion, the finding that program firms do not use a different technology is unlikely to 
be driven by selection bias or endogeneity of factor inputs. 
 
5.  Assessing Program Impact on Earnings 
 
Descriptive statistics, presented in Table 6, confirm that workers in program firms are on average 
                                                 
7 We also experimented with control function approaches. The results we obtained were similar to the results 
obtained using IV methods; they are omitted to conserve space, but available upon request.   -7-
better educated than workers in non-program firms. Table 7 presents probit models of the probability 
of being hired by a program firm. The first column is the baseline specification with age, gender, 
education and a dummy for having completed an apprenticeship as explanatory variables. Column 2 
adds dummies for prior activities to this baseline specification to test whether program firms draw 
disproportionately on workers with an underprivileged labor market status. Column 3 adds dummies 
for workers' entire employment history and column 4 includes both employment history and prior 
activity dummies. 
As to be expected, having a TVET degree is strongly positively associated with the 
probability of being employed in a program firm. The importance of training is further evidenced by 
the positive and significant coefficient on having completed an apprenticeship in the past, although 
this may also reflect the fact that those who do not pass the test can join the firm as apprentices. The 
insignificance of prior activity dummies reveals that program firms do not draw disproportionately on 
unemployed workers, casual workers and workers in otherwise marginal jobs. Focusing on the entire 
employment history of individuals instead demonstrates that workers who have experienced a 
significant unemployment spell (e.g. longer than three months) in the past, workers who have 
experience working in a cooperative, as well as workers who have experience as a domestic employee 
are significantly more likely to be employed in program firms, whereas workers who have experience 
as casual workers are less likely to be employed in program firms. 
  To model the impact of the program on wages, W,  a standard earnings function approach is 
used. Wages are modeled as a function of observable characteristics, X,  such as age, education and 
firm-characteristics, and the type of firm the worker is employed in,Dj.  The potential endogeneity of 
participation and schooling are the two major obstacles to successfully estimating this earnings 
function. Selection bias arises when participants differ from non-participants in terms of unobserved 
characteristics that affect both earnings potential and the probability of being employed in a program 
firm, thus creating a correlation between the error term and the regressors and consequently causing 
the OLS estimator to be biased. To tackle this selection problem the Lee selection correction is used.
8 
The potential endogeneity of schooling, arising for example because of a correlation between 
schooling and ability, is also addressed by means of a control function approach. As pointed out by 
Söderbom et al. (2005), when the return to education is non-linear, control function estimators of the 
returns to schooling are likely to result in more precise estimates of schooling than 2SLS estimators. 
In addition, control function estimates of the returns to schooling are more robust than 2SLS 
estimators when slope parameters vary with unobserved factors (see also Card, 2001). Of course, a 
drawback of the control function approach is that it forces us to make (implicit) distributional 
assumptions which can be difficult to test. 
A related modeling problem is that the benefits from participation might well be 
heterogeneous; those who lack alternative opportunities and have low earnings potential are likely to 
benefit more from program participation than individuals with high earnings potential. In particular, it 
is anticipated that the benefits from participating in the program are inversely related to the level of 
educational attainment. To allow for this possibility, the gains from participation are allowed to 
depend on observables following Blundell & Costa Dias (2002). Assuming a (log-linear Mincerian 
relationship between earnings, our estimable equation takes the form:  
 
ε θ β β β α + + + + + = ) , ( Z X j XD
j T X j D
j T X X W  
where  ) , ( Z X θ  is a vector of terms hat correct for endogeneity bias due to selection and the 
                                                 
8 This Lee selection correction (see Lee, 1983) is based on the multinomial logit model,which is appropriate 
since workers can be employed in 4 different types of firms; program contractors, non-program contractors, 
program constructors and non-program contructors. We also used the Dubin McFadden selection corrections 
(which outperform the Lee estimator if sample sizes are not too small as shown by Bourguignon et al. (2007)) 
but this led to very imprecise estimates. In addition, we explored the possibility of doing IV-estimation but 
could not find sufficiently convincing instruments. We also experimented with matching estimators, but do not 
present these as they do not allow for selection on unobservables and because results were very similar to those 
obtained by means of OLS.    -8-
endogeneity of schooling.
9 These selection correction terms are a function of observables that 
affect both participation and earnings, X, and variables that affect participation only, Z, the 
exclusion-restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, program participation has no impact on 
earnings, i.e. βTP=0 and βXTP=0   where βTP is the coefficient on the dummy that indicates that 
a worker is employed in a program (constructor) firm, while βXTP  is the coefficient on the 
interaction term between program participation and observable characteristics, X, intended to 
capture heterogeneity in the benefits of program participation. Such heterogeneity exist if the 
null hypothesis of homogenous returns, βXTP=0 is rejected. 
 
Table 8 presents the results from OLS estimation of earnings functions. Column 1 presents 
the results of regressing monthly income on days worked, a dummy for being a casual worker, gender, 
age and its square, years of schooling and its square, employment history dummies and firm type 
dummies, forcing the gains from program participation to be homogenous. The results are consistent 
with the literature; returns to schooling are convex,
10 wages for casual workers are significantly lower 
than those for permanent workers, the age-earnings profile is concave, and the negative coefficient on 
the gender dummy attests to the existence of widespread discrimination against women in the labor 
market. Turning to the results of central interest, workers in program constructors earn 25% more than 
workers in non-program constructing firms, though there is a 60% premium associated with working 
for a contractor. In column 2 the assumption that the returns to schooling are homogeneous is relaxed 
and interactions between program participation and returns to schooling are included as additional 
regressors. While these interaction terms are not significant in this specification, their signs suggest 
that those with the least education benefit the most from partaking in the program. 
  In column 3 we allow for the endogeneity of education by including the predicted residual of 
a model of educational attainment and interactions of this residual with program participation as 
additional regressors. The model of educational attainment is presented in Table A2 in the appendix 
and uses distance to school at the age of six and parental occupation as exclusion restrictions. The 
terms are not jointly significant and parameter estimates do not change very much; the endogeneity of 
schooling is unlikely to be a serious problem as also evidenced by the Hausman test, which 
comfortably accepts the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of schooling. 
We would like to know why program constructors pay more than non-program constructors 
and consider firm size, capital intensity and input intensity as candidate explanations.
11 Adding a 
control for firm-size in column 4 does not affect the pattern of results, which suggests that the 
program premium is not due to a positive association between firm size and wages.
12 To test whether 
capital- and input-intensity can explain the program premium, the capital-labor ratio and input-
intensity are included as explanatory variables in columns 6 and 7. Unfortunately information on these 
variables is not available for all workers, forcing us to drop about 40% of our sample. For the 
resulting subsample the null hypothesis of heterogeneity in the treatment effect is rejected since the 
interaction terms between schooling and program participation are significant at the 10% level. In 
addition, the estimated program premium increases and is individually significant.
13 Somewhat 
                                                 
9 Note that if returns to program participation are heterogeneous and program participation and schooling are 
both endogenous, we should also control for the endogeneity of the interaction of schooling and participation. In 
the context of our model this is done by interacting the terms correcting for selection bias with the terms which 
correct for the endogeneity of schooling. 
10 Years of schooling and years of schooling squared are jointly significant at the 5% level. 
11 We also experimented with other firm characteristics, such as the age of the firm, the organizational structure 
of the firm (for example whether the firm is a cooperative or not), and the activities the firms engage in, but 
these variables could not explain why program firms pay more. 
12 Note that the sample has been reduced by 14 workers. However, differences in sample composition are not 
driving the results; estimates available upon request. 
13 These are sample selection effects. To rule out the possibility that changes in coefficients are due to changes 
in the composition of the sample, specification 4 is re-estimated on the subsample of workers for whom 
information on the capital- and input- intensity of the firms they work in is available (see column 5). This sub-
sample contains only 11 casual workers, which is reflected in the coefficients on days-worked and the casual 
dummy; both are now insignificant; the casual-dummy because it is imprecisely estimated; the days worked   -9-
surprisingly, capital per worker and inputs per worker are not significant predictors of earnings, while 
there seems to be a positive relationship between firm size and earnings. 
  Table 9 presents results using Lee's selectivity corrections (the underlying multinomial logit 
model for selection of workers into different types of firms is presented in the Appendix in Table A3 - 
prior activity and employment history dummies are used as exclusion restrictions), Columns 1 and 2 
assume education is exogenous, while column 3 and 4 allow for the endogeneity of schooling. All 
specifications control for individual characteristics. Columns 2 and 4 also control for firm 
characteristics. None of the selection terms are individually or jointly significant in any of the 
specifications. In addition, resulting parameter estimates are very similar to OLS estimates. This 
indicates that endogeneity is not a major issue. Once again, the estimated return to program 
participation is higher for the subsample of observations for whom information on capital stock, input 
usage and size of the labor force is available (see columns 2 and 4). In addition, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of a homogeneous treatment effect for this subsample. Finally it should be noted that there 
is a positive association between firm size and wages. 
In sum, the estimated program premium is rather robust and endogeneity is not of major 
empirical importance. The estimated premium is highest for the poorest workers. As a robustness 
check to test whether the IHDP indeed has had an equity enhancing impact on the earnings 
distribution quantile regressions were estimated. These regressions are presented in tables 10A and 
10B and confirm that the program premium is highest for those at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution.  
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Active labor market programs, such as the AAIHDP, are widely viewed as a means to provide 
employment opportunities for the poor by providing more, relatively unskilled, jobs. To do that they 
must either use a more unskilled labor intensive technology or use more unskilled labor per unit of 
capital for a given technology. We have found that the technology of program firms is not 
significantly different from the technology used by firms outside the program, a conclusion which is 
robust to controlling for selection bias and endogeneity of factor inputs. Program firms are not more 
labor intensive and use more skilled labor than non-program firms.  
  We find there is an earnings premium associated with program participation which is 
heterogeneous and inversely related to educational attainment. It is unlikely to be driven by selection 
bias. It may reflect the fact that workers in program firms are often also the owners of such firms 
enables them to capture the return to capital. If this is the explanation then there is not a premium to 
labor for those participating in the program.  
Given that the program has not altered technology or labor-intensity it is unlikely to have 
resulted in a higher level of labor demand than would have been generated had contracts been 
awarded to existing firms. Given the existence of excess demand and shortages of key construction 
inputs it is possible that the AAIHDP has led to some crowding out. The data at our disposal do not 
enable us to assess such general equilibrium effects quantitatively. These are an area for future 




Ackerberg, D., Benkard, L., Berry, S., & Pakes, A. (forthcoming) Econometric Tools for Analyzing 
Market Outcomes, Forthcoming chapter in Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 6. 
 
Ackerberg, D., Caves, K. & Frazer, G. (2005) "Structural Identification of Production Functions" 
University of Colorado Working Paper. 
 
Betcherman, G., Olivas, K. & Dar, A. (2004) "Impacts of Active Labor Market Programs: New 
Evidence from Evaluations with Particular Attention to Developing and Transition Countries" Social 
                                                                                                                                                        
variable because variation in days worked among permanent workers is small. The implied age-earnings profile 
is anomalous but insignificant. The other coefficient estimates are rather stable.   -10-
Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0402. 
 
Biesebroeck, Van, J. (2005) “Firm Size Matters: Growth and Productivity Growth in African 
Manufacturing”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 53(3). 
 
Biggs, T. (2002) "Is Small and Beautiful Worthy of Subsidy?", IFC Discussion Paper. 
 
Bigsten, A & Gebreeyesus, M. (2007) “The Small, the Young and the Productive: Determinants of 
Manufacturing Firm Growth in Ethiopia” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol 55(4).  
 
Blundell, R.& Costa Dias, M. (2002) "Alternative Approaches to Evaluation in Empirical 
Microeconomics" CEMMAP Working Paper, CWP 10/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 
Bourguignon, F., Fournier, M. & Gurgand, M. (2007) "Selection Bias Corrections Based on the 
Multinomial Logit Model: Monte Carlo Comparisons" Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol 21, No. 1. 
 
Card, D. (2001) "Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Evidence on Some Persistent Econometric 
Problems.", Econometrica, Vol. 69(5). 
 
Dar, A. & Tzannatos, Z.P (1999) “Active Labor Market Programs: A Review of the Evidence from 
Evaluations” World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9901. 
 
Fretwell, D., Benus, J. & O’Leary, C. (1999) “Evaluating the Impact of Active Labor Market 
Programs: Results of Cross Country Studies in Europe and Asia” World Bank Social Protection 
Discussion Paper No. 9915.  
 
Global Development Solutions (2006) "Integrated Value Chain Analysis for the Housing Construction 
Sector in Ethiopia" 
 
Halberg, K. (2001) "A market-oriented strategy for small and medium-scale enterprises."  
Discussion Paper No. 40. International Finance Corporation. 
 
HDPO (2004) "Brief Project Profile", mimeo. 
 
Lee, J. (1983) "Generalized Econometric Models with Selectivity" Econometrica, Vol. 51, No 3. 
 
Söderbom, M., Teal, F., Wambugu, A. & Kahyarara, G. (2005) "The Dynamics of Returns to  
Education in Kenyan and Tanzanian Manufacturing" GPRG Discussion Paper GPRG-WPS-017. 
World Bank (2004) "Land and Housing in Addis", mimeo. 
 
World Bank (2007) "The Addis Ababa Integrated Housing Program - Background Paper to a survey 
of firms and workers in the construction sector in Addis", mimeo. 
 
(no author) (2004) "Addis Ababa Integrated Housing Development Program", mimeo. 
 
(no author) (2005) "Low Cost Housing: Would This Be the Solution?" Construction Ahead: Bi-
monthly interface with the construction industry September-October. 
 
(no author) (2007) "Mugher Cement Enterprise Increases Cement Price" Addis Fortune: accessed 
January 5, 2007 via: http://www.docengines.com 
 
   -11-
TABLES AND GRAPHS 
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Note: All monetary measures in Ethiopian Birr (ETB). 1 USD dollar is worth approximately 9.1 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Firms 








  mean   sd  mean  sd  mean  sd  mean  sd 
Firm-age  3.78 4.33 2.27 1.80  6.95  4.90  6.65  6.00 
Revenue              
Revenue (log)  11.56  1.39  11.94  1.26  13.92  1.59 14.30 1.59 
Factors              
Workers  (log)  1.86 0.68 2.56 0.62  3.09  1.48  3.33  1.37 
Capital (log)  9.97  2.26  10.71  1.51  12.39  2.06  12.97  1.80 
Inputs(log) 10.94  1.64  11.37  1.65  13.30  1.44  13.95  1.48 
Capital per worker 
(log) 




9.09 1.62 8.81 1.50  10.20  1.33  10.62  1.25 
Education of the 
workforce (years) 
7.65 2.86 9.51 2.76  8.77  2.92  9.27  2.75 
Characteristics of the workforce    
Age of the 
workforce 
29.68 7.70  28.52 6.49  27.37  6.68  26.96  6.36 
Labor force at 
startup (log) 
1.49 0.87 2.40 0.84  1.92  1.60  2.83  1.25 
Price Deflators 
Output  price  deflator  1.11 0.46 0.97 0.36  1.06  0.41  1.08  0.34 
Input price deflator   1.01  0.45  1.03  0.40  0.93  0.41  0.91  0.33 
Complete 
observations 
78   70   9    13     -13-
 
Table 2: Explaining Capital Intensity  - OLS 
Dependent variable: Log of Capital per worker  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Workers(log) 0.141  0.140  -0.213 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
Program-dummie    0.006 0.122 
   (0.27)  (0.26) 
Contractor     1.766*** 
     (0.35) 
Constant  8.084*** 8.083*** 8.546*** 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
N  222 222 222 
R2  0.007 0.007 0.108 
Adjusted R2  0.002  -0.002  0.096 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
Table 3: Explaining Input-Intensity - OLS 
 Dependent variable: Log of Input  per worker  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Workers(log) -0.135  -0.359**  -0.346**  -0.283* 
 (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Program-Non-Contractor     -0.145   
     (0.26)   
Program-Contractor     0.536   
     (0.63)   
Contractor   1.901***  1.502***  1.586*** 
   (0.36)  (0.53)  (0.38) 
Capital-Labor-Ratio       0.201*** 
       (0.06) 
Program-dummie   -0.049    -0.097 
   (0.25)    (0.25) 
Constant 9.459***  9.750***  9.767***  7.955*** 
 (0.32)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.62) 
N 185  185  185  175 
R2 0.006  0.143  0.148  0.186 
Adjusted R2  0.0005  0.129  0.129  0.166 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Table 4: Production Functions - OLS 
Dependent variable: Log of  annual revenue  
  All Constructors  Constructors 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Factors      
Workers(log) 0.121  0.210  0.223 
 (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Capital(log) 0.046  0.046  0.041 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Inputs(log) .596***  .597***  .595*** 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Activity Dummies      
PCB 0.234  0.351  0.333 
 (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
HCB -0.068  0.054  0.085 
 (0.16)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
Gravel 1.001**  1.174**  1.215 
 (0.46)  (0.52)  (0.52) 
Wood 0.046  0.128  0.137 
 (0.17)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
Wall -0.079  0.040  0.052 
 (0.26)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Structural 0.468  0.375  0.367 
 (0.42)  (1.18)  (1.19) 
Electrical -0.357  -0.279  -0.291 
 (0.36)  (0.45)  (0.45) 
Sanitary .559*  0.563  0.550 
 (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.37) 
Finishing 0.097  0.060  -0.007 
 (0.30)  (0.41)  (0.41) 
Other 0.270  0.271  0.320 
 (0.27)  (0.31)  (0.32) 
Production-inputs 0.178  0.279  0.297 
 (0.24)  (0.28)  (0.29) 
Interaction Terms      
Large-Contractor -2.522**     
 (1.26)     
Contractor*Workers 0.104     
 (0.18)     
Contractor*Capital .222**     
 (0.11)     
Program-dummie   0.883  0.682 
   (1.16)  (1.19) 
Program*Workers   -0.233  -0.219 
   (0.26)  (0.26) 
Program*Capital   -0.040  -0.029 
   (0.10)  (0.10) 
Program*Inputs   -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.10)  (0.10) 
Human Capital      
Education of the Workforce      0.028 
     (0.03) 
Age of the Workforce      0.00002 
     (0.02) 
Constant 4.245***  3.982***  3.789*** 
 (0.54)  (0.74)  (0.90) 
N 170  148  148 
R2 0.775  0.669  0.672 
Adjusted R2  0.75  0.623  0.62   -15-
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Table 5: Production Functions – Instrumental Variable Estimation, Constructors only 
Dependent variable: Log of annual revenue  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factors       
Capital-per-worker  (log)  0.035 0.049 0.090 0.035 0.042 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) 
Inputs-per-worker  (log)  0.73***  0.596*** 0.467*** 0.708*** 0.962*** 
  (0.17) (0.05) (0.11) (0.18) (0.31) 
The Impact of the program       
Program-Dummie   -0.489  -2.017  -0.396  5.215 
    (0.55) (1.88) (0.59) (3.52) 
Program-capital-per-worker  (log)     -0.178  0.008 
     (0.26)  (0.34) 
Program-Inputs-per-Worker (log)      0.305    -0.674 
     (0.20)  (0.49) 
Activities       
PCB  0.032 0.323 0.451 0.229 0.551 
  (0.22) (0.33) (0.58) (0.38) (0.60) 
HCB  -0.184 -0.037 -0.032 -0.147 -0.105 
  (0.24) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) 
Gravel 0.978*  0.827*  1.29**  1.04*  0.364 
  (0.56) (0.47) (0.65) (0.56) (1.05) 
Wood  0.068 0.094 0.059 0.116 0.172 
  (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) 
Wall  0.018 0.043 0.275 0.087 0.013 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.51) (0.35) (0.63) 
Structural  -0.013 0.130 0.315 0.001 0.056 
  (1.17) (1.13) (1.25) (1.16) (1.37) 
Electrical  -0.303 -0.272 -0.265 -0.283 -0.383 
  (0.43) (0.43) (0.47) (0.43) (0.51) 
Sanitary  0.563 0.460 0.308 0.564 0.700 
  (0.39) (0.35) (0.40) (0.39) (0.50) 
Finishing  0.041 -0.048 -0.138 -0.015 -0.041 
  (0.40) (0.39) (0.46) (0.40) (0.50) 
Production-inputs 0.094  0.106  0.117  -0.030  -0.430 
  (0.36) (0.35) (0.54) (0.39) (0.62) 
Other  0.291 0.260 0.090 0.224 0.327 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.41) (0.32) (0.51) 
Constant 2.695***  3.912***  4.859***  3.038**  0.833** 
  (1.32) (0.54) (0.94) (1.46) (2.60) 
Endogenous       
Inputs  per  worker  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Program  Dummy    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Program*inputs  per  worker     Yes  Yes 
Program*capital per worker      Yes    Yes 
Instruments Included       
Input  Price  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Labor force at startup    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Lab force at start*inputspw      Yes    Yes 
Lab force at start*capitalpw      Yes    Yes 
Lab force at start*Input Price          Yes 
Anderson LR  13.95  13.03  4.55  8.67  3.35 
Cragg-Donald F  13.24  12.23  1.36  4.01  0.749 
N  148 148 148 148 148 
Hausman Chi(2) (df )  0.77(13)  0.39 (14)  4.50 (16)  0.96(14)  3.96(14) 
Prob  Chi(2)  1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Note: All monetary measures in Ethiopian Birr (ETB). 1 USD dollar is worth approximately 9.1 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics Workers 








  mean Sd mean Sd Mean Sd  Mean Sd
Age  28.62 8.63 28.65 6.85 30.51 7.61  27.62 6.41
Sex  0.81 0.40 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35  0.77 0.42
Monthly  pay(log)  5.77 0.76 6.12 0.84 6.52 1.00  6.42 1.01
Days  worked  per  month(log) 3.05 0.40 3.09 0.34 3.01 0.49  3.13 0.27
casualdummie  0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.27 0.45  0.29 0.46
(Highest level of ) Educational Attainment 
Years of schooling  8.64  4.31 10.33 3.79 10.88  3.36  10.26 4.36
Primary  0.43 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43  0.33 0.48
Secondary  0.47 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47  0.59 0.50
College  0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.14  0.03 0.17
TVETcomplete  0.15 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.45  0.39 0.49
Entire Employment History 
Apprenticeship completed in 
the past 
0.25 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48  0.39 0.49
Goverment  employee  0.10 0.30 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.42  0.20 0.40
employee in a firm  0.42  0.49 0.44 0.50 0.51  0.51  0.44 0.50
Domestic  employee  0.06 0.23 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33  0.15 0.36
Family  worker  0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00  0.05 0.21
Self-employed  0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28  0.05 0.21
Employed in a cooperative  0.02  0.14 0.14 0.34 0.04  0.20  0.08 0.27
Casual  workers  0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28  0.03 0.17
Prior Activity           
Unemployed  0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35  0.21 0.41
Employee in a firm  0.25  0.43 0.31 0.46 0.41  0.50  0.36 0.48
Self  employed  0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.31  0.01 0.12
Casual  workers  0.16 0.37 0.22 0.42 0.06 0.24  0.18 0.39
Student  0.22 0.41 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43  0.15 0.36
Government  Employee  0.04 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.14  0.07 0.26
Inactive  0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14  0.00 0.00
Instruments for educational attainment 
Distance to school (log)  3.34  0.75 3.19 0.71 3.20  0.65  3.12 0.66
Father was a farmer  0.37  0.48 0.24 0.43 0.20  0.41  0.32 0.47
Father was a civil servant  0.21  0.41 0.32 0.47 0.31  0.47  0.30 0.46
Mother was a farmer  0.15  0.36 0.11 0.31 0.10  0.31  0.06 0.24
Mother was a housewife  0.64  0.48 0.62 0.49 0.61  0.49  0.68 0.47
Complete observations  310  224 48    64  -17-
 
Table 7: Being Hired by a Program Firm: Probit Selection Models 
Dependent variable: working in a program firm 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Primary 0.19  0.22  0.18  0.20 
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Secondary 0.19*  0.23*  0.18  0.21* 
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
College 0.25  0.26  0.19  0.22 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
TVET 0.19***  0.22**  0.19***  0.21*** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Sex 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
 (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Apprenticeship 
completed 
0.17 0.15  0.16  0.15 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Activity Prior to Current Job 
-unemployed    0.15  0.14 
   (0.12)    (0.12) 
-employee   0.12  0.14 
   (0.11)    (0.12) 
-self-employed    0.03  0.13 
   (0.14)    (0.17) 
-casual    0.21  0.27 
   (0.11)    (0.11) 
-student   -0.03    0.07 
   (0.12)    (0.12) 
Employment History 
-unemployment   0.21***  0.20*** 
     (0.04)  (0.05) 
-government     0.13 0.10 
     (0.06)  (0.07) 
-employee    -0.01  -0.05 
     (0.04)  (0.06) 
-domestic     0.20  0.17* 
     (0.07)  (0.08) 
-family worker      0.10  0.11 
     (0.13)  (0.13) 
-self-employed     -0.09  -0.08 
     (0.09)  (0.12) 
-cooperative     0.32***  0.31*** 
     (0.08)  (0.08) 
-casual     -0.13  -0.17 
     (0.07)  (0.07) 
N 661  658  661  658 
LR Chi2  101.6(17)  110.44(23)  153.69(25)  161.12(25) 
Pseudo R2  0.1109  0.1282  0.1686  0.1774 
Note: 
-*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
-Marginal effects, evaluated at the mean 
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Table 8: Earnings Regressions - OLS 
Dependent variable: log of  monthly earnings 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Days per month (log)  0.525***  0.519***  0.522***  0.542***  -0.208  -0.209  -0.230 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.104)  (0.11)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28) 
CasualDummie -0.377***  -0.385***  -0.384*** -0.425***  -0.412  -0.381  -0.413 
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.073)  (0.10)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26) 
Age 0.005  0.002  0.004  0.0009  -0.017  -0.021  -0.020 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.026)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
AgeSquared 0.007  0.010  0.006  0.011  0.035  0.039  0.039 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.038)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Sex 0.383***  0.398***  0.399***  0.403***  0.359***  0.354***  0.373*** 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.084)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Schooling -2.60e-06  -0.020  -0.021  -0.008  0.016  0.014  0.015 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.055)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Schooling2 0.002  0.004*  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.003)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Program*Schooling  0.022  0.057  0.003  -0.079  -0.079  -0.078 
   (0.07)  (0.114)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Program*Schooling2   -0.003  -0.005  -0.002  0.0009  0.001  0.0008 
   (0.00)  (0.005)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Prior-Casualwork 0.214**  0.213**  0.213**  0.243***  0.305***  0.298***  0.301*** 
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.099)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Prior-employee firm  0.219***  0.216***  0.218***  0.221***  0.147  0.147  0.147 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.076)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Appr. in the past  0.085  0.085  0.086  0.084  0.135  0.156*  0.153 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.065)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
v     0.005         
     (0.025)         
v2     0.000         
     (0.004)         
v*program     0.003         
     (0.040)         
v2*program     0.003         
     (0.006)         
Contractor 0.711***  0.685***  0.685***  0.668***  0.716***  0.79***  0.653*** 
 (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.136)  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.22) 
Program*Contractor -0.204 -0.076 -0.250 -0.002  0.554  0.536  0.540 
 (0.15)  (0.34)  (0.637)  (0.35)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
Program-Constructor 0.255***  0.348  0.188  0.417  0.849*  0.915**  0.861* 
 (0.07)  (0.31)  (0.608)  (0.32)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.45) 
Workers       0.024  0.085    0.103* 
       (0.04)  (0.05)    (0.05) 
Capital-Intensity         -0.008  -0.008 
           (0.02)  (0.02) 
Input-Intensity           0.040  0.05* 
           (0.03)  (0.03) 
Constant 2.955***  3.028***  2.997***  2.857***  5.402***  5.334***  5.07*** 
 (0.52)  (0.53)  (0.59)  (0.54)  (1.01)  (1.03)  (1.04) 
N 550  550  550  536  345  345  345 
R2 0.353  0.357  0.358  0.367  0.26  0.259  0.268 
Adjusted R2  0.325  0.327  0.322  0.334  0.199  0.196  0.203 
Note: 
- Subcity dummies included but not reported 
- Hausman test of endogeneity for column 3: Chi2(24)=0.72 
- V is the residual from the education model 
- Standard errors in column 3 bootstrapped. 
- *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Table 9: Earnings Regressions - Lee Selection Corrections 
Dependent variable: Log of monthly earnings 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Days per month (log)  0.519***  -0.263  0.518***  -0.265 
 (0.132)  (0.28)  (0.11)  (0.28) 
CasualDummie -0.385***  -0.409  -0.386***  -0.405 
 (0.069)  (0.26)  (0.09)  (0.26) 
Age  0.002 -0.019 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.022)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
AgeSquared 0.010  0.037  0.005  0.021 
 (0.031)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Sex 0.398***  0.366***  0.401***  0.371*** 
 (0.069)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
Schooling  -0.020 0.015 -0.013 0.013 
 (0.043)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Schooling2 0.004  0.003  0.004  0.002 
 (0.003)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Prog*Schooling  0.022 -0.077 0.034 -0.057 
 (0.081)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Prog*Schooling2 -0.003  0.0009  -0.004  -0.0003 
 (0.004)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Prior-Casualwork  0.213**  0.305*** 0.21** 0.299*** 
 (0.102)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.12) 
Prior-employee firm  0.216***  0.153  0.214***  0.146 
 (0.068)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10) 
ApprenticeshipCompleted 0.084  0.142  0.086  0.15* 
 (0.065)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Contractor  0.347  0.452* 0.676*** 0.469* 
 (0.382)  (0.26)  (0.17)  (0.26) 
Program-Contractor  0.681***  0.499 -0.130 0.396 
 (0.163)  (0.48)  (0.36)  (0.49) 
Program-Constructor -0.077  0.781*  0.316  0.719 
 (0.428)  (0.45)  (0.32)  (0.46) 
Workers   0.115**    0.11** 
   (0.06)    (0.06) 
Capital-Intensity   -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.02)    (0.02) 
Input-Intensity   0.045    0.044 
   (0.03)    (0.03) 
Lee  0.005 0.265 -0.032 0.216 
 (0.144)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.21) 
V     -0.003  0.026 
     (0.04)  (0.05) 
V2     -0.003  -0.003 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
VLee     0.009  -0.006 
     (0.03)  (0.04) 
V2Lee     0.005  0.005 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
Constant 3.026***  4.994***  3.001***  4.937*** 
  (0.611) (1.04)  (0.58) (1.06) 
N 0.357  345  550  345 
R2  550 0.272  0.359 0.275 
Adjusted  R2  0.325 0.205  0.322 0.198 
Note: 
- Subcity dummies included but not reported 
- V is the residual from the education model 
- Bootstrapped standard errors 
- *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Table 10A: Quantile Regressions - No Firm Controls 
Dependent variable: Log of monthly earnings 
 p10  p25  p50  p75 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Days per month (log)  0.641***  0.669***  0.562***  0.373*** 
 (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Casual Dummie  -0.354***  -0.348***  -0.317***  -0.230*** 
 (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Age 0.010  0.006  0.010  -0.043*** 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age Squared  -0.002  0.001  -0.009  0.077*** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Sex 0.39***  0.369***  0.359***  0.299*** 
 (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Schooling 0.073**  0.079***  -0.500**  -0.021 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Schooling2 -0.002  -0.002*  0.005***  0.004*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Prior-Casualwork 0.150  0.071  0.011  0.160 
 (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Prior-employee firm  0.155  0.084*  0.135**  0.296*** 
 (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Apprenticeship Completed  0.049  0.108**  0.045  0.041 
 (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Contractor 0.681***  0.654***  0.647***  0.645*** 
 (0.18)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Program-Contractor -0.172  -0.148  -0.289  -0.188 
 (0.22)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Program-Constructor 0.265***  0.21***  0.147***  0.193*** 
 (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Constant 1.42**  2.017***  3.411***  4.842*** 
 (0.69)  (0.36)  (0.37)  (0.34) 
Pseudo R2  0.32  0.21  0.17  0.23 
N 550  550  550  550 
Note: 
- *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
- Subcity dummies included but not reported 
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Table 10B: Quantile Regressions with Firm Controls 
Dependent variable: Log of monthly revenue 
 p10  p25  p50  p75 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Days per month (log)  0.107  -0.078  -0.107  -0.023 
 (0.16)  (0.29)  (0.23)  (0.17) 
CasualDummie -0.031  -0.214  -0.236  -0.124 
 (0.09)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (0.19) 
Age 0.019  0.015  0.007  -0.045** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
AgeSquared -0.006  -0.011  -0.001  0.077*** 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Sex 0.325***  0.334**  0.346***  0.278*** 
 (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Schooling 0.124***  0.038  -0.019  -0.014 
 (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Schooling2 -0.004***  0.0001  0.003  0.003 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Prior-Casualwork 0.038  0.057  0.112  0.201* 
 (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Prior-employee firm  0.081  0.077  0.012  0.233** 
 (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Apprenticeship Completed  0.001  0.022  0.063  0.165** 
 (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
Contractor 0.686***  0.310  0.302  0.554*** 
 (0.10)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
Program*Contractor -0.231*  -0.201  -0.186  -0.113 
 (0.14)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.23) 
Program-Constructor 0.172**  -0.030  -0.029  0.009 
 (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Workers 0.067*  0.166***  0.141**  0.097* 
 (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Capital-Intensity 0.029**  0.036  0.019  0.006 
 (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Input-Intensity 0.027  0.077**  0.035  0.038 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Constant 2.087***  3.455***  4.838***  5.579*** 
 (0.69)  (1.12)  (0.87)  (0.68) 
Pseudo R2  0.22 0.14  0.15  0.21 
N 345  345  345  345 
Note: 
- *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
- Subcity dummies included but not reported 
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table A1.1: First Stage- IV - Columns 1 to 3 














 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Factors         
Capital-per-
worker 
0.152** -0.015  0.033  0.204  0.116 
 (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.36)  (0.33) 
Inputs-per-
worker 
 0.026  0.072  0.545  0.414 
   (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.49)  (0.46) 
Activities         
PCB 0.472  0.314***  0.354***  3.267***  3.298*** 
 (0.33)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (1.06)  (0.99) 
HCB 0.89***  -0.035  -0.026  -0.276  -0.219 
 (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.88)  (0.83) 
Gravel -2.120***  0.129  0.127  1.147  1.540 
 (0.68)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (2.28)  (2.15) 
Wood -0.306  0.198**  0.182*  1.666*  1.149 
 (0.30)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.86)  (0.81) 
Wall  -0.540 0.091 0.086  0.914  1.622 
 (0.51)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (1.52)  (1.43) 
Structural 0.875  0.028  0.053  0.354 1.199 
 (1.83)  (0.59)  (0.59)  (5.23)  (4.92) 
Electrical 0.152  0.049  0.028  0.216 0.018 
 (0.69)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (1.98)  (1.86) 
Sanitary  -0.908 0.024 0.049  0.492  -0.176 
 (0.56)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (1.63)  (1.54) 
Finishing -0.101  -0.133  -0.134  -1.163  -1.312 
 (0.63)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (1.79)  (1.69) 
Production-
inputs 
0.522 -0.307**  -0.334**  -3.237***  -3.081*** 
 (0.47)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (1.24)  (1.16) 
Other 1.472***  -0.159  -0.150  -1.370  -1.606 
 (0.39)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (1.35)  (1.27) 
Instruments        
Labor-at-start 0.121*** 0.164*** 0.581*  2.186  1.682 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.28)  (2.52)  (2.37) 
Labor-at-
start*capital 
   -0.023  0.094  -0.104 
    (0.03)  (0.24)  (0.22) 
Labor-at-
start*inputs 
   -0.028  -0.215  0.028 
    (0.02)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
Constant 7.063***  -0.005  -0.760  -5.168 -2.951 
 (0.55)  (0.28)  (0.59)  (5.24)  (4.93) 
N 148  148  148  148  148 
R2 0.381  0.387  0.398  0.414  0.395 
Adjusted R2  0.321  0.322  0.325  0.342  0.321 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Table A1.2: First Stage- IV - Columns 4 and 5 
Column in IV  4  4  5  5  5  5 







 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Factors          
Capital-per-worker 0.153** -0.011  0.033  0.022  0.147  0.018 
 (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.04)  (0.37)  (0.33) 
Activities          
PCB 0.529  0.329***  0.463  0.278**  3.637***  2.775*** 
 (0.36)  (0.12)  (0.37)  (0.11)  (1.07)  (0.93) 
HCB 0.912***  -0.009  0.848***  -0.045  0.245  -0.399 
 (0.30)  (0.10)  (0.30)  (0.09)  (0.87)  (0.72) 
Gravel -2.044**  0.080 -2.162*** 0.281*  -0.676  2.649* 
 (0.71)  (0.23)  (0.72)  (0.17)  (2.10)  (1.40) 
Wood -0.326  0.189**  -0.264  0.149*  1.547*  0.995 
 (0.30)  (0.10)  (0.30)  (0.09)  (0.88)  (0.72) 
Wall -0.490  0.079  -0.485  0.158  0.573  2.039 
 (0.53)  (0.17)  (0.52)  (0.14)  (1.53)  (1.18) 
Structural 0.847  0.060  0.767  -0.354  0.894  -2.272 
 (1.84)  (0.59)  (1.83)  (0.35)  (5.33)  (2.90) 
Electrical 0.149  0.049  0.169  0.220  0.274  1.253 
 (0.70)  (0.22)  (0.69)  (0.17)  (2.01)  (1.46) 
Sanitary -0.887  4.42e-06  -0.879  0.020  -0.035  -0.142 
 (0.57)  (0.18)  (0.56)  (0.16)  (1.64)  (1.31) 
Finishing -0.101  -0.138  -0.114  -0.097  -1.309  -1.088 
 (0.63)  (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.16)  (1.83)  (1.31) 
Production-inputs 1.423***  -0.270**  1.423***  -0.282**  -2.298*  -2.719*** 
 (0.41)  (0.13)  (0.41)  (0.12)  (1.19)  (1.00) 
Other 0.503  -0.149  0.514  -0.115  -0.949  -1.171 
 (0.47)  (0.15)  (0.47)  (0.12)  (1.36)  (0.99) 
Instruments          
Inputprice 0.119***  -0.002  0.049  -0.010  -0.175  -0.103 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Labor-at-start -0.063  0.159***  -0.654  0.301*  2.055  -0.004 
 (0.15)  (0.05)  (0.56)  (0.17)  (1.62)  (1.38) 
Labatstart*inpprice    0.065*  0.011 0.219*  0.108 
     (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
Labatsrat*cappw     0.067  -0.018  -0.135  0.125 
     (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.20)  (0.17) 
Constant 7.175***  0.199  8.19***  -0.040  0.184  1.448 
 (0.61)  (0.20)  (1.05)  (0.33)  (3.05)  (2.73) 
N 148  148  148  169  148  169 
R2 0.382  0.382  0.398  0.386  0.39  0.392 
Adjusted R2  0.317  0.317  0.325  0.321  0.315  0.328 
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Table A2: OLS -comparison IV production functions 
Dependent variable: Log of annual revenue 
Columns compared:  1  2 and 4  3 and 5 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Factors 
Capital-per-worker  0.055 0.053 0.047 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Inputs-per-worker  0.586*** 0.589*** 0.605*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
The Impact of the program 
Program-Dummie   -0.159  -0.027 
   (0.17)  (0.92) 
Program-capital-per-worker    0.022 
     (0.09) 
Program-Inputs-per-Worker    -0.036 
     (0.09) 
Activities 
PCB  0.096 0.170 0.170 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
HCB  -0.050 -0.046 -0.045 
  (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) 
Gravel  0.674 0.724 0.679 
  (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) 
Wood  0.023 0.046 0.056 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Wall  -0.063 -0.029 -0.050 
  (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) 
Structural  0.154 0.146 0.121 
  (1.18) (1.18) (1.12) 
Electrical  -0.294 -0.287 -0.286 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.42) 
Sanitary  0.424 0.436 0.457 
  (0.36) (0.37) (0.35) 
Finishing 0.015  -0.005  0.001 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.38) 
Production-inputs  0.315 0.247 0.232 
  (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
Other  0.360 0.328 0.341 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
Constant  3.754*** 3.805*** 3.709*** 
  (0.52) (0.53) (0.62) 
N  148 148 148 
R2 0.6  0.603  0.603 
Adjusted  R2  0.561 0.561 0.555 
 Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively   -25-
 
Table A3: The determinants of educational 
attainment-OLS 





















Adjusted R2  0.298
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Table A4: Multinomial Logit Selection Model 






 Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
Age -0.01  0.02  0.04  0.03  -0.02  0.02 
Primary Complete  0.78  0.49  -0.12  0.81  0.43  0.74 
Secondary Complete  1.10**  0.50  0.66  0.80  0.29  0.74 
College 0.57  1.33  0.80  1.55  1.24  1.30 
TVET complete  0.70**  0.28  -0.21  0.48  1.34***  0.41 
Sex 0.23  0.27  0.01  0.51  -0.25  0.38 
Apprentice in the past  0.72  0.21  0.62  0.39  0.46  0.32 
Employment History 
-ever unemployed  0.91  0.23  -0.35  0.39  0.55  0.34 
-government employee  0.58  0.36  1.04**  0.56  0.79  0.52 
-employee -0.23  0.28  0.63  0.49  0.07  0.41 
-domestic  0.67 0.41 0.91  0.62 1.55**  0.55 
-self employed  -0.84  0.57  -1.82  0.98  0.18  0.86 
-working in a coop  1.67  0.49  0.25  0.92  0.92  0.68 
-casual  worker  -0.66* 0.35 -0.35  0.65 -1.71**  0.79 
Activity Prior to Current Job 
-unemployed 0.48  0.52  0.90  1.18  2.03  1.21 
-employee 0.54  0.54  0.39  1.18  2.05  1.21 
-self employed  1.24  0.76  1.63*  1.45  0.46  1.70 
-casual worker  1.00*  0.54  -0.53  1.29  2.20  1.22 
-student 0.34  0.53  1.03  1.17  1.46  1.25 
-govt employee  0.32  0.74  -1.46**  1.61  1.92  1.38 
N 661           
LR Chi2 (90)  912.41           
Pseudo R2  0.2067           
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
 
 